Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 19846 has elicited pressures both here and abroad for the protection of all functional designs on similarly relaxed conditions, pressures to which the British government acceded in 1988. 7 The paradoxical result is that the only industrialized country never to afford appearance designs any sui generis protection at all-the United States-seems on the verge of enacting a sui generis law to protect functional designs of every kind 8 that would radically undermine the patent system and the free-market principles it sustains.
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This article, based on the findings of a recent monograph, 1 0 was initially drafted in the hopes of enlisting Chairman Kastenmeier's aid in resolving this paradox.I It seems fitting to publish it here, as an expression of my respect for his accomplishments and as a plea that his concern for the public interest will continue to inspire those responsible for intellectual property legislation.
II

THE NEED FOR A SPECIAL DESIGN LAW
The enactment of an appropriate design protection law is in the best interests of the United States. Historically, the opponents of such laws contend that because sound marketing strategy requires manufacturers to improve the appearance of their products, consumers would have to pay unjustifiably high prices if industrial designers routinely obtained exclusive proprietary rights. ' 2 This same kind of argument was previously levelled against other forms of intellectual property protection, including patents and copyrights, by those who believe the market always solves its own problems.
Today, however, economists have a clearer understanding of just how intellectual property laws tend to organize relatively efficient markets for 6 . While the patent law denies eligibility to any discovery that fails to meet the requirements of novelty, nonobviousness and utility, 35 USC § § 102-03 (1988), the copyright law requires only "original works of authorship," 17 USC § 102(a) (1988) investment in intangible intellectual goods.' 3 Recent studies suggest that industrial design, like computer programs and other forms of applied scientific know-how, cannot yield long-term rewards to innovators if the shortterm profits from successful innovation are consistently appropriated by freeriders who do not share the costs and risks of the creative process.' 4 A lack of adequate legal protection for industrial designs penalizes those industries willing and able to strengthen their domestic and international competitiveness by risking substantial investment in design innovation.' 5 American industry is confronted with a discriminating and increasingly integrated world market in which the ability of all countries, including developing countries, to supply standardized industrial products at competitive prices is a new fact of economic life. If industrialized countries are to maintain their comparative advantages in this global market, they must continue to outdistance the newcomers in regard to both advanced technological innovation and the design of more conventional productsendeavors in which the industrialized countries possess deeper resources of skill, capital, and marketing expertise.
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It should be emphasized that the most innovative designs are usually developed by small-and medium-sized firms that make up for a lack of market power by exceeding slothful oligopolists in improving the appearance and functional efficiency of their products through new and costly engineering techniques. Because the fruits of this investment do not remain sealed behind factory walls, however, manufacturers cannot invoke state trade secret laws that protect other forms of unpatented, noncopyrightable innovation.i 7 On the contrary, industrial design concerns intangible products of skilled efforts that are embodied in useful articles and distributed on the open market. Such products bear their know-how on their faces: anyone who obtains possession of the tangible support can swiftly reproduce the intangible design know-how it embodies without having to incur even the costs of reverse engineering.S Because free-riding competitors duplicate only those designs that have already captured the public's fancy and achieved commercial success, they have no losses from unsuccessful essays to recoup and no research and development costs to defray. Their ability to price imitated goods below the innovator's marginal costs enables free-riders to reduce the innovator's lead time to zero. 19 Although consumers benefit from this unbridled price competition in the short run, the small-and medium-sized producers whose talents are their primary assets will be driven out of target markets over time by cut-throat competitors who never adequately fund the process of design innovation. 20 Meanwhile, foreign producers, benefiting in part from better design laws, inundate our markets with well-designed products that first attract the most discriminating buyers and then capture large segments of the mass market whose constituents also want products that do more than satisfy bare human needs.
2 1
Anyone who demands empirical evidence that poor design constitutes a serious handicap in today's world market has only to study the balance of trade statistics and the bearish message they harbor. 2 2 A fair conclusion is that small-and medium-sized industry needs appropriate legal tools to fend off free-riders and also to oblige the larger industries to pay for the actual costs of the designs they often borrow. Given the proper incentives, the products of our design industries could compete more effectively with imported goods in vulnerable domestic markets, while there is every reason to expect these same industries to enhance our export potential as well. 23 This said, let me briefly survey the design protection schemes already in place, with a view to understanding how they could be improved without triggering new diseconomies that might jeopardize the benefits of legislative reform.
III
PRESENT STATUS OF DESIGN PROTECTION LAw
Turning to the legal status of industrial design in domestic law, my latest study shows that the United States already has more design protection than a casual observer might suppose and far more of the wrong kind of protection than is good for a competitive economy. The first reference is to the Design Patent Act of 1842,24 which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has revitalized in recent years. Even when cases from the Court's early, transitional phase and from the later, more mature phase are combined, the results are hardly less astonishing. Of twenty-two relevant cases known to have reached the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit between 1982 and the first half of 1990, there were only two instances of invalidation for functionality.
3 3 Of eighteen cases in which the inventive height was directly or indirectly challenged, there were only three instances of invalidation for obviousness. 3 4 Of ten relevant cases known to have reached the decisive phase of an infringement action between 1983 and the first half of 1990, four concerned patented designs that were ultimately found valid and infringed.3 5 These findings do not mean that the United States already possesses an efficient, modern design law. For example, the design patent law still requires a full examination of the prior art, which makes it too costly, slow and cumbersome for the bulk of the commercial designs competing in today's fastpaced consumer markets. Moreover, the statutory requirement of nonobviousness by definition excludes all but the most exceptionally creative designs, and it affords little or no protection to the kind of incremental innovation that is characteristic of the design industries as a whole. Nevertheless, most of the sui generis design laws operating in the European Community countries are only marginally better. For example, foreign laws (with some exceptions) tend to allow designers no novelty grace period in which to test-market their output. Hence, those laws invalidate far more designs for lack of novelty than does the United States patent law, 3 7 whose one-year grace period benefits designs in commerce.3 8 Moreover, the requirements of registration and deposit under foreign law, though less onerous than in the United States, remain too costly and burdensome for most foreign designers to make routine use of these laws. Finally, both the qualitative originality standard and, with some notable exceptions, the functionality standard that most foreign design laws impose in one form or another tend to exclude the bulk of the designs they are nominally supposed to protect.
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On both sides of the Atlantic, one discerns a recurring, cyclical pattern that swings from states of chronic underprotection to states of chronic overprotection and then back to underprotection once again. An initial condition of underprotection stems from the assimilation of ornamental designs to the full patent paradigm, as still occurs in the United States and in a few other industrialized countries. Because very few designs ever satisfy the substantive and procedural requirements of a developed patent system, proponents of reform often stress the artistic nature of industrial design in order to justify protection under the mature copyright paradigm of the Berne Union countries. The cyclical pattern this strategy triggers can be summarized as follows:
Traditionally, the right to copyright protection is premised on a claim that certain industrial designs are entitled to legal recognition as art in the historical sense. The [adverse] economic repercussions of such recognition flow principally from the industrial character of the material support in which ornamental designs are embodied. The incidence of these repercussions upon any given system varies with the extent to which the claim to recognition as art is itself given effect. As copyright protection for designs of useful articles expands, the . . .
[anticompetitive] effects of this expansion on the general products market induce countervailing pressures to reduce the scope of protection acquired in the name of art. As protection in copyright law correspondingly contracts, pressure for recognition of industrial art as a legally protectible form of industrial property normally increases. The tendency of industrial property law to breed still further instances of underprotection [that is, in sui generis laws built on modified patent principles] or overprotection [that is, in unfair competition laws sounding in the misappropriation rationale] then fosters renewed pressures for the regulation of industrial art within the framework of the laws governing literary and artistic property. 40 In other words, chronic underprotection in industrial property law leads to chronic overprotection in artistic property law, which in turn inspires further reactive reforms of industrial property law tending to reinstate levels of underprotection that will foster renewed appeals to copyright law.
It may be helpful to illustrate this cyclical pattern by reference to certain lamp designs that have figured prominently in domestic law. Consider, for example, the famous lamps in the shape of Bali dancers that entered United States copyright law when the Supreme Court decided Mazer v. Stein 41 in 1954. These lamps established the category of applied art in United States copyright law at a time when the design patent law gave no effective protection and the Universal Copyright Convention required some minimal recognition of this subject matter. To avoid overprotecting industrial art in Between 1964 and 1976, designers turned back to copyright law for occasional relief and increasingly challenged the Register's restrictive interpretation of Mazer v. Stein, which had never received legislative endorsement. In the 1970s, some United States courts began to allow certain three-dimensional designs of useful articles to enter copyright law, notwithstanding the separability criterion embodied in the regulations. This movement culminated in early 1976, when a federal district court admitted Esquire's outdoor parking lamp to copyright law because it was ornamental by day and useful by night. 4 7 Suddenly, the exorbitant protection of industrial designs in copyright law that still occurs under the French system 48 seemed an acquired fact of United States intellectual property law.
Of course, Congress repudiated this decision later in 1976 by codifying the criterion of separability in section 101 of the Copyright Act. 4 9 In 1978, the District of Columbia Circuit retroactively invalidated the copyright in 42 . See Reichman, 1983 Duke LJ at 1181-88 (cited in note 2) (citing authorities) (discussing origins of the separability doctrine in Italian law and its deliberate adoption by U.S. copyright authorities); see also Esquire's lamp design on the strength of this provision. 50 But Congress did not enact a sui generis design law in 1976, 5 ' while the Sears-Compco decisions of 1964 continued to bar state unfair competition laws from treating slavish imitation as a discrete business tort. 52 In principle, designers had nowhere to turn once again, and another round of chronic underprotection seemed likely to ensue.
In reality, the federal appellate courts soon began to transform section 43(a) of the Lanham Act into a judge-made design law that afforded product configurations indefinite protection as unregistered appearance trade dress. 53 Between 1985 and 1991, the designs of such highly utilitarian objects as luggage and handbags, 54 plastic stacking trays, 55 beverage servers, 56 folding picnic tables, 5 7 fishing reels, 58 and industrial clamps 59 all received de facto protection against copying on this approach. 60 The full irony of this latest swing of the pendulum appears from two decisions, handed down in 1987 and 1989, concerning modern designs of halogen desk lamps developed in Italy. 61 Under the legislation currently in force, neither the "Tizio" nor the "Dove" lamps qualified for hard protection on hard conditions for a period of fourteen years in design patent law, nor could they have obtained soft protection on soft conditions for a period of seventy-five to one hundred years in literary and artistic property law. 6 design of halogen desk lamp entitled to preliminary injunction against copying as appearance trade dress); PAF S.r.l. v Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F Supp 394 (SDNY 1989) ("Dove" design of halogen desk lamp protected against copying as appearance trade dress that had acquired secondary meaning and was not functional). See also Bauer Lamp Co. v Shaffer, 941 F2d 1165 (11 th Cir 1991) (Neoclassic lamp designs were protected trade dress). For the revealing background to the "Dove" lamp case, which also shows the different kinds of benefits that accrue to the U.S. market from local investment even in foreign designs, see Lowy, 19 U Bait L Rev 160 (cited in note 15).
62. See note 6 (differentiating strict prerequisites of eligibility in patent law from the requirement of mere independent creation in copyright law) and notes 27 & 50 (effects of federal district court nonetheless protected both high-tech designs against copying for an indefinite period of time as nonfunctional appearance trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 6 3 By 1989, in short, lamp designs like those denied copyright protection in 1976 routinely obtained more than copyright law had to offer under federal unfair competition law, even though Congress had refused to grant similar designs even ten years of protection on modified copyright principles in 1976! 64 Whether these excesses will survive the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 65 remains to be seen. By reinvigorating Sears-Compco and reinstating the primacy of statutory intellectual property laws, this decision may restrain the federal appellate courts from covertly treating slavish imitation of product designs as a business tort for the immediate future. 6 6 If so, however, an incipient period of overprotection in federal unfair competition law will simply give way to another period of chronic underprotection in design patent law unless Congress takes this occasion to enact a sui generis design law.
IV
REGULATING A DISRUPTIVE LEGAL HYBRID
The American experience sketched above is strikingly similar to that of the other industrialized countries, and this resemblance is all the more remarkable when viewed in relation to the much longer period in which these countries have struggled with the issues that design piracy continues to separability criterion on works of applied art). An issued patent forbids even independent creation by unauthorized third parties, 35 USC § 271 (a) (1988), whereas copyright law prohibits only copying but not independent creation. raise. 6 7 Comparative analysis further shows that foreign legislative initiatives have failed to break the cyclical pattern illustrated above because sui generis design laws are almost invariably built on modified patent principles. 68 The modified patent approach merely institutionalizes a state of chronic underprotection, while softening to some degree the procedural and substantive prerequisites of the full patent law paradigm.
Innovative industrial design typically concerns variations on known style trends that seldom take major strides beyond the prior art. 6 9 The designer's know-how consists in giving physical expression to technical, organizational, and marketing demands, and in harmonizing these demands with aesthetic features in products that appeal to the world market. 70 Increasingly, this know-how includes the use of laser holograms, computer-generated displays, and other new techniques, as well as the psychological and sociological inputs of human factors engineering.
7 '
A patent approach normally excludes most incremental innovation by definition. 72 Because even the most innovative product bears its design knowhow on its face, risk takers have little or no possibility of invoking the trade secret laws that otherwise protect unpatented innovation. 73 In this respect, the design industries do resemble publishers of literary and artistic works who lack autonomous means of appropriating the fruits of high-risk investment in creations that attain commercial success. 74 Publishers of literary and artistic works look to the mature copyright paradigm of the Berne Union countries, whose pliant modalities of protection serve to establish a better balance between private and public interests than would occur under purely competitive conditions. By the same token, the design industries whose products behave like literary and artistic works in the open market have repeatedly sought relief from copyright laws because the structural modalities of the copyright paradigm provide a coherent legal response to a common economic predicament. 75 These observations do not mean that industrial designers should obtain all the benefits of the mature copyright paradigm; the opposite is true. Application of copyright law to industries that systematically exploit innovative know-how imposes intolerable restraints on trade and soon tends to stifle the very incremental innovation that prompted the demand for copyright protection in the first place. 7 6 Moreover, broad application of copyright law to useful articles gradually subverts the capacity of the patent law to regulate competition on the general products market. This follows because the appearance designs of useful articles, which typically begin life as two-dimensional graphic works like any other commercial paintings, end by driving the markets for such products as automobiles, refrigerators, and dental equipment. The foregoing analysis does suggest that the legal protection of industrial designs (and of important new technologies as well) would greatly benefit from a judicious adaptation of copyright law that does not unduly disrupt the workings of a competitive market for industrial products. The task, in short, is to provide innovative design industries with a minimum period of artificial lead time in which to recoup their investment, without succumbing to the philosophical mystique of intellectual property laws that keep fair followers from entering the market. 77. See Reichman, 19 U Bait L Rev at 130-32 (cited in note 10). It is this capacity of appearance designs to compete in both the market for artistic works (as works of applied art) and in the general products market that aggravates the design problem. No facile invocation of general principles of copyright law will make this two-market conundrum disappear. designs in place of the modified patent approach prevalent in foreign law. 80 The latest and most refined variant on this theme was launched by the Max Planck Institute in 1990,81 and it has attracted support from the Commission of the European Communities.
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The modified copyright principles of S.2075 still constitute an interesting approach to the unsolved design puzzle, even though further refinements have become desirable in the light of past experience. 83 From this angle, the virtue of the latest design bills pending before Congress is that, in one form or another, they would all institute a modified copyright approach. 8 4 However, their biggest drawback is that they would expand the subject matter of protection to cover functional designs of every kind, including, for example, many automobile and tractor spare parts, while maintaining the soft substantive and formal prerequisites heretofore thought appropriate for purely decorative design features that appeal to the eye. 86. The pending bills propose a general originality standard in the sense of independent creation, and they exclude staple or commonplace designs as well as designs that have become industry standards. However, any design derived from a staple, commonplace, or standard design that introduces a significant variation would be allowed, unless it was "dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it." See, for example, Industrial Design Protection at 3-5 (cited in note 11) (statement of Oman on HR 902, § § 1001, 1003); id at 485-87 (criticizing these provisions for lack of clarity); Design Innovation and Technology Act, HR 1790 § 1002 (cited in note 84).
world intellectual property law. 8 7 In the past, countries willing to protect unpatented functional designs enacted utility model laws requiring standards of inventive activity that were only moderately less exigent than the nonobviousness standard of patent law."" Countries that protect utility models, including Italy, Japan, Germany, and a growing number of developing countries, seek to encourage small-scale innovation that is particularly suited to local conditions. These laws nonetheless require evidence of a significant inventive contribution 9 because the external configuration of virtually every utilitarian product affects its functional efficiency or performance. Unless competitors remained free to imitate the bulk of routine functional designs, utility model laws would convert design protection into a formula for diffuse monopolization of the general products market. Proposals to protect functional designs on much softer standards than those of utility model laws or, indeed, in return for no significant quantum of creative achievement whatsoever, constitute an unprecedented assault on the free market principles that underlie both domestic and international trade. 9 0 Moreover, such proposals complicate an already difficult subject by casting fresh doubts on what exactly the sponsors of these legislative initiatives are trying to accomplish and why. If their object is to protect all innovative shapes or forms that have an industrial application, it begs the question as to why this type of innovation, but not others, should escape the price-setting function of the marketplace. If their concern is to encourage investment in innovation that remains particularly vulnerable to appropriation by freeriders, one wonders why other forms of incremental innovation that are at least as socially beneficial as functional designs should not be rescued from a similar fate. 9 1 For example, why not protect unpatentable biogenetically altered organisms under a parallel sui generis regime? And why tolerate exorbitant protection of industrial literature (that is, computer programs) in copyright law, only to confine industrial art and functional designs generally to a sui generis regime? 9 2
The long-term answer to these questions is that the world's intellectual property system needs a law to protect applied know-how far more than it needs another batch of sui generis design laws. 93 In this respect, any design protection law, even if limited to appearance designs, represents merely one of numerous legal metaphors that legislators have used to provide indirect protection of unpatented, noncopyrightable know-how under a classical intellectual property system dominated by the patent and copyright paradigms. This topic, introduced in my recent studies, is more fully explored in a work-in-progress entitled Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms.
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Direct protection of applied know-how would require, however, a higher degree of consensus concerning legal means and economic ends than currently exists, and it has nothing to do with the automobile and tractor industries' thinly disguised demand for trade protection in the spare parts market. 95 Routine protection of functional designs lacking any significant creative contribution cannot be reconciled with either the theoretical and economic underpinnings of classical intellectual property law or. the conceptual underpinnings of a new paradigm devised to protect incremental innovation bearing know-how on its face. 9 6 Before any new intellectual property model can reach the drawing boards, industry must tire of disaggregating new technologies into static components that are crammed into existing legal models 97 and must wholeheartedly investigate proposals to protect the dynamic aspects of present-day innovation under a unified, sui generis approach. Meanwhile, it seems unwise to throw more ad hoc legal solutions at a moving target, and it would be economic folly to enact an overly broad functional design right that saddled virtually every product on the market with some legal restraint on trade.
The validity of the pending design bills in their present form thus remains open to question even by those, like myself, who remain staunch supporters in principle of sui generis protection for innovative appearance designs. A tolerable sui generis solution should protect commercial designs insofar as they enhance sales appeal by virtue of "an ensemble of lines, surfaces, volumes, and profiles connected with each other in subtle or unique ways so as to give a characteristic external appearance to an article." 9 8 But protection should not extend beyond the creatively fashioned "look" or image that the designer conveys through features not prompted by purely functional demands of the article in question.
In this regard, I trust that Congress will resist the temptation to enact disguised barriers to trade in the form of intellectual property law. And I pray that this premature digression into the realm of functional designs will not ultimately derail efforts to enact the kind of sui generis reform that might truly help our design industries to expand their share of a discriminating world market.
98. Ladas, 2 Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights at 829 (cited in note 88).
